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Summary 
This thesis investigates whether national amnesties for war crimes constitute 
an inadmissibility ground for a case in the International Criminal Court 
(hereinafter the ICC). The essence of this problem lies in the conflict be-
tween State sovereignty and international cooperation in the fight against 
impunity for war crimes and consequently between bilateral obligations and 
obligations erga omnes. My intention with the thesis is to find the balance 
between these standards.  
 
I find it important to resolve the problems of the current topic for several 
reasons. The granting of amnesties is a far from uncommon method of com-
ing to terms with past conflicts. However, the Rome Statute of the ICC 
(hereinafter the Rome Statute) is silent regarding amnesties. Consequently 
the ICC will eventually have to make a decision whether a case is admissi-
ble before the court when an amnesty will be or has been granted to an al-
leged perpetrator. The lack of certainty in this case could result in negative 
effects for the ICC, such as arbitrary and politicised decisions and non-
equality between States. Also nationally in the State that has admitted am-
nesties problems such as difficulties in the reconciliation process and in the 
establishment of the rule of law could occur.  
 
I have come to a conclusion to the current problem mainly through a theo-
retical discussion. However, to gain a complete picture of the problem I find 
it important to understand and recognise the practical consequences of dif-
ferent reconciliation methods. The practical difficulties of an absolute pro-
hibition of amnesties are demonstrated in this thesis by case studies from 
South-Africa, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. 
 
In the more theoretical part of my investigation of the compatibility of war 
crimes’ amnesties with international law I look to general international law 
and the Rome Statute. In general international law there are mainly three 
possible obstacles for the granting of amnesties for war crimes. They are 
found in international humanitarian law, in international customary rules of 
a peremptory character and in international human rights law. States have 
decided, through treaties and international customary law, upon an obliga-
tion to prosecute serious breaches of international humanitarian law. This 
obligation to prosecute would naturally constitute an obstacle for amnesties 
for the crimes in question. The progress made in international criminal law 
relating to a stronger international cooperation is directly linked with the 
special character of serious war crimes. This leads us to another possible 
obstacle, which could be the legal consequence that the special character of 
these crimes attaches. Many international legal scholars would argue that a 
peremptory character of war crimes logically leads to an obligation upon all 
States as against to all other States to ensure the prosecution of the alleged 
perpetrators of these crimes. This comprehension is however far from un-
disputed. A third bar from accepting amnesties for war crimes could be that 
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this would violate international human rights law, more precisely the vic-
tims’ right to justice. My investigation of problems related to the granting of 
amnesties for serious war crimes suggests that the point of departure is that 
amnesties are not allowed for such crimes.  
 
An investigation of the principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute 
seems to lead us to the same conclusion. Although the actual wording of the 
article is rather ambiguous, an extended interpretation of the meaning of the 
article seems to refrain from using amnesties for war crimes. The main pur-
pose of the ICC is to fight impunity. Considering the creation of the court 
the initiators of the tribunal seem to believe that prosecution would best 
fulfil this purpose. Further, the court shall, according to article 21 of the 
Rome Statute, apply treaties and principles or rules of international law if 
the statute is not guidance enough when deciding on a case. Therefore, the 
conclusion of the investigation of the principle of complementarity of the 
Rome Statute is reached in conjunction with the conclusion of general inter-
national law made above. It essentially declines that amnesties is an inad-
missibility ground for the ICC.  
 
As a conclusion I have tried to find a compromise between the different 
interests at stake with the expectation to show respect for both sides of the 
problem. I have included a definition of the exceptions to prosecution in 
certain particular occasions, which should be explicitly and thoroughly de-
fined. The definition describes the type of amnesty that should be applied 
and in what situation such application would be relevant. Hopefully by em-
ploying such limits a balance could be struck between State sovereignty and 
the fight against impunity.  
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Preface 
I have had the fortune not to personally experience war crimes. I believe 
that this luck of mine does not alleviate me, as a member of the international 
community, from having a certain responsibility to deal with the crimes that 
are being committed, if not personally then through State representation. 
This is where international law comes into the picture. If we learn to use it 
right I believe that it could be a valuable tool in the work against interna-
tional crimes.1 This possibility is what I find most fascinating with interna-
tional law and what has lead me to write my master thesis in this field of 
study. I am aware that this personal belief influences the approach taken in 
this thesis, although I hope I have succeeded in accounting for all relevant 
aspects of the problem at hand.   
 
I had just returned from the international rounds of the Philip C. Jessup 
Moot Court Competition when I started the work on this thesis. I was at the 
time recuperating from several months of arguing against all amnesties for 
serious war crimes. Everything I had read and written was coloured with 
this opinion. From my point of view prosecution was essential in the “fight 
against impunity”. In the course of the work I had to rethink that idea and I 
have since then changed my opinion several times. I have come to appreci-
ate the importance of respecting different methods of recovering from a na-
tional crisis but also the importance of a common set of rules to avoid arbi-
trary exploitation of world opinion and politics. 
 
The topic of this thesis is inspired of the fictional case of the competition 
mentioned above and the experiences from it have been a point of departure 
in this work. Therefore I would like to thank my fellow teammates Caroline 
Fransson, Leah Hoctor and Anja Gusch for valuable insights and discus-
sions on this subject. I also want to thank our coaches Ineta Ziemele and 
Gudmundur Alfredsson for providing me with support and knowledge. Fur-
ther I would like to thank my supervisor Ulf Linderfalk for suggestions in 
the course of the writing.  
                                                 
1 Serious international crimes include war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and 
grave breaches of international humanitarian law according to the definitions in the report, 
Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political) 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.12 October 1997 Revised final report prepared by Mr Joinet. 
pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 1996/119, Annex 2 (B). 
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Abbreviations 
IACHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ILC International Law Commission 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
PRIDE Post-Conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and 
Empowerment 
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
UN United Nations 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background to the ICC and Amnesties 
 
The idea of creating an international criminal court has been developed over 
a long period of time; the International Criminal Court (ICC) itself dates the 
first progress back to 1474. Great advancement was made after the Second 
World War with the Nuremberg trials but it was not until 1995 that the ne-
gotiations of the ICC, as it presently stands, were introduced. The Rome 
Statute of the Court was adopted in July 1998. It came into force in July 
2002 after 60 ratifications. In February 2003, 85 States had ratified the 
Rome Statute.2  
 
The history of amnesties is also extensive but the last 4 decades have been 
revolutionary in this regard. In the 1970’s the movement for amnesties for 
political prisoners was mobilised. The activists were Non-Governmental 
Organisations (hereinafter NGO’s), political opposition and human rights 
advocates. Amnesty was a symbol for freedom.3 In the 1980’s the use of 
amnesties changed to become a technique for impunity. The persistent am-
nesty supporters were now dictators and their likes. People started to get 
organised to protest against this type of amnesties. In the 1990’s the situa-
tion changed again. The cold war ended and new democracies tried to find a 
way to reconcile with its past and at the same time impose the rule of law.4 
Today, we are going through a fourth ambivalent stage where the interna-
tional cooperation against impunity for certain crimes is strengthened, 
something that the creation of the ICC is an extraordinary example of. The 
challenge of the first decade of the 21st century is to strike a balance be-
tween national reconciliation and international prevention of international 
crimes.   
 
1.2 Complementarity of the ICC and the 
Granting of Amnesties 
 
The principle of complementarity is enshrined in non-operative paragraph 
ten and article 17 of the Rome Statute; it gives national authorities the pri-
                                                 
2 <www.icc-cpi.int/basicdocs/romestatute.html> Last accessed 7 September 2004. 
3 Definition of Amnesties: the formal act of liberating someone, a warrant granting release 
from punishment for an offence, a period during which offenders are exempt from punish-
ment, grant a pardon to (a group of people).  Ed. R.W. Burchfield, The Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2nd Edition (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989) Vol. I, p. 103. 
4 Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political) 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.12 October 1997, Revised final report prepared by Mr Joinet 
pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 1996/119, paras. 2-6. 
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mary possibility and responsibility to prosecute the crimes within the juris-
diction of the ICC. A case is only admissible to the court if a case is not 
being or has not been investigated by a State that has jurisdiction to try it. 
The exceptions to this essential rule are if the State in question is deemed 
unwilling or unable to try the case. 
 
The principle of complementarity is important for the functioning of the 
ICC for several reasons. It is a safeguard for the sovereignty of States since 
it gives the primary opportunity of prosecution to national authorities. It is 
further essential for the practical functioning of the court considering issues 
of efficiency and economy. There are a number of advantages that favour a 
national prosecution before a prosecution by the ICC; applicable law is 
more developed, evidence and witnesses are more easily available, language 
problems are avoided to mention a few.5 But how far does the principle of 
complementarity extend?  
 
It was noted during the negotiations of the Rome Statute that the article en-
shrining complementarity should possibly, directly or indirectly, address 
amnesties.6 Although the question was raised at the Rome Conference, no 
decision about amnesties was taken7 and the final version of the Rome Stat-
ute does not mention amnesties.8  
 
The granting of amnesties is a complex matter; its character, purpose and 
reception can vary immensely.9 Today amnesties are a relatively common 
instrument in the process of national reconciliation after a conflict. Thus, a 
situation when the ICC must assess whether to respect a nationally settled 
amnesty for a crime within its jurisdiction is in my opinion to be expected.  
 
1.3 Problems and Purpose 
 
Today it is no longer controversial, but stating the obvious when claiming 
that the position of State sovereignty in international law is changing. The 
focus on the individual and the protection of her rights has been favoured in 
relation to sovereignty issues. This development has lead to a progress in 
the protection of human rights and respect for humanitarian law. But how 
far has this change of focus reached? Are all serious violations of humani-
tarian law the concern of all States, not limited to one? If it is, who should 
have the possibility to hold the offenders accountable? And lastly, who 
should decide how to hold the perpetrators accountable? The underlying 
conflict for these questions are the balance between bilateral obligations 
                                                 
5 Some were brought up by States at the preparatory conferences, Bassiouni, supra, p. 620 
6 Article 35 at that time, Bassiouni, ibid fn 5 p. 354 fn 21. 
7 Bassiouni, ibid fn 5 pp. 385 and 441. 
8 John Dugard, Possible Conflicts of Jurisdiction with Truth Commissions (p. 700) Ed 
Cassese, Gaeta and Jones, ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2002). 
9 In chapter 3 I have provided for a more thorough assessment of the issue.   
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between States and obligations erga omnes, between State sovereignty and 
the fight against impunity for international crimes and between restorative 
and retributive justice. 
 
In my opinion the lack of certainty regarding the relationship of amnesties 
and the ICC is a problem. It may put all the advantages of amnesties at stake 
by not allowing processes leading to reconciliation to take place. Further-
more, it could defy the credibility of the ICC as an institution if not meeting 
its main challenge that is to avoid impunity for serious international crimes. 
The risk of disrespect for the equality between States is also increased if one 
State’s amnesties are accepted but another State’s are not. My final serious 
concern is related to the very purpose of the rule of law in general. Every 
shortage of predictability in international law about the status of amnesties 
for the ICC makes an arbitrary use of powers possible. 
 
This thesis is intended to approach the relation between the principle of 
complementarity of the ICC and the granting of national amnesties. My 
main question is if this principle prevents the ICC from prosecuting a sus-
pected war criminal to which a national investigation leading to an amnesty 
has been commenced. Is it possible to grant amnesties for serious war 
crimes?  
 
1.4 Method and Materials 
 
As the question of issue considers the statute of a court that has not yet held 
any trial this thesis consequently discusses possible future decisions by the 
ICC. The point of departure is the important precedence of investigating 
serious international crimes as those the ICC deals with. I find it helpful to 
crystallise the opinio juris of the international community, concerning the 
view on these crimes and on amnesties, by investigating past experiences by 
ad hoc tribunals and national commissions. Also, for the purpose of balanc-
ing national peace and reconciliation with the international strive against 
impunity it is interesting to investigate achievements and flaws of precedent 
solutions. However, it is important to note that these examples can be no 
more than guidelines to the general opinion about amnesties as the crimes 
concerned are generally not war crimes, and most importantly as they all 
lack the inclusion of a principle of complementarity in their regulations.  
 
Further, the work by international legal scholars and other international ac-
tors will provide a basis for examining the international opinion concerning 
amnesties. Though a useful tool, also these sources must be viewed with 
caution considering how controversial issues concerning the ICC are.  
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1.5 Disposition  
 
My intention with this thesis is to explain the problem with amnesties in 
international law in general and the Rome Statute in particular and suggest 
some solutions to this problem. To be able to do this in a meaningful way I 
judge it necessary to explain some key concepts for the understanding of the 
topical issues. 
 
In chapter two I will demonstrate the difficulties with the balancing act be-
tween reconciliation and prevention in practice by making a presentation of 
the reconciliation processes in South Africa, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. The 
purpose is mainly to gain a more profound understanding of the problem at 
stake by showing the practical consequences of certain policies. In the fol-
lowing chapter three, I make a presentation of different types of amnesties 
with the intention to clarify and emphasise the variance of motives and 
models and consequently legitimacy of different amnesties. Chapter four 
moves on to examine the recognition of amnesties in international law. This 
analysis is composed to demonstrate three possible legal hindrances for am-
nesties in international law; a duty to prosecute war crimes, the effects of a 
peremptory character of war crimes and the incompatibility of amnesties 
with certain human rights norms. As this thesis seeks to distinguish the lim-
its of the principle of complementarity in relation to the granting of munici-
pal amnesties it includes an investigation of that principle as enshrined in 
the Rome Statute. Chapter five is logically closely linked to chapter four, as 
the Rome Statute constitutes part of international law. I have interpreted 
article 17 of the Rome Statute in search of the views of the Member States 
relating to amnesties for war crimes as a possible obstacle for prosecution 
by the International Criminal Court. Chapter five is followed by a general 
conclusion where I have summoned my observations and presented my re-
sultant theory. 
 
The discussion about national reconciliation after a conflict and prevention 
of international crimes has several interesting dimensions where the legal is 
one. The sociological, psychological, political, philosophical and moral as-
pects of the discussion are intriguing and important however, I have in this 
thesis chosen to focus on the judicial questions.  
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2 Learning from the past and 
present 
 
2.1 Advantages and Disadvantages with 
International Prosecution 
 
When making an interpretation of the relation between the principle of 
complementarity and amnesties I find it important to consider the conse-
quences a certain reading would have. Such reflection will, in my opinion, 
most probably affect the interpretation made by the ICC. Therefore, it is 
interesting to take a look at different methods of accountability and recon-
ciliation methods throughout the world. 
 
The prosecution of war crimes has the advantages to be a discouragement 
for future abuses and a deterioration of private revenge. Other important 
consequences include the reinforcement of the respect for the rule of law in 
a State and the guarantee of due process for suspects. For an authority to 
gain legitimacy and reinstall peace and the rule of law after the commission 
of serious international crimes it must not only bring to justice those respon-
sible of atrocities. It is also intrinsic in this process that the alleged perpetra-
tors are all treated according to general principles of due process. Further, 
the prosecution facilitates a historic record by securing firm proofs. 
  
However, a strict imposition of prosecution as the only valid accountability 
measure and particularly prosecution conducted by the ICC in spite of na-
tional amnesties attaches certain problems. The criticism of neo colonialist 
behaviour by some States to solemnly implement a traditional western ap-
proach towards accountability is one such problem. The elimination of al-
ternatives to prosecution is argued to be a somewhat narrow-minded view. 
Linked to this critique is the risk of selectivity in the case of an international 
prosecution. The few persons that are being prosecuted could be seen as 
‘martyrs’ in the eyes of the public. The selectivity also refers to certain con-
flicts, the conflicts not dealt with in international prosecutions are indirectly 
being granted ‘amnesties’.10 Another possible disadvantage is the deteriora-
tion of the possibilities for a smooth transition for new governments in trou-
bled areas. A final visible problem may include certain practical disadvan-
tages of a single-handed rejection of amnesties as an alternative for prosecu-
tion.  
 
                                                 
10 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, (Beacon Press, Boston, Massa-
chusetts, 1998) p. 30. 
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2.2 National Reconciliation vs. International 
Prevention 
 
An important point of departure when approaching accountability for seri-
ous international crimes is that the interest of the affected State and the in-
ternational community as a whole may not always be the same although 
they do overlap.  
 
After a national trauma the two main objectives for a country is generally to 
create stability for the future and to reconcile with the past. Many different 
opinions have been raised on how to most successfully accomplish these 
goals and several methods have been tried. The various manners have not 
always included prosecution, but at times actively excluded it.  
 
The goal of the international community after the commission of serious 
international crimes is somewhat different. The main interests are the main-
tenance of peace and security and the prevention of the reoccurrence of such 
crimes in the future in any part of the world, a concern that transcends the 
interest of any State as articulated by the Yugoslavian tribunal.11 The most 
important tool we know for international prevention is probably prosecu-
tion.12  
 
I will in the following sections present three national systems that represent 
different views and problems. The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (hereinafter TRC) was a groundbreaking enterprise. It was a 
refined version and a significant progress in the development of TRCs and 
of criteria for the granting of amnesties. Nonetheless, it was not created 
without controversies and it may have resulted to be a setback for prosecu-
tions for international crimes. The second system presented is the Rwandan 
that represents some of the great difficulties a justice and reconciliation ven-
ture attaches. However, the presentation also demonstrates the current 
Rwandese solution to practical problems with bringing genocidaires to jus-
tice. The third example is Sierra Leone where the present solution chosen is 
a combination with a TRC and a hybrid court. The arrangement is not un-
problematic although it represents a great progress and pioneering regarding 
international criminal law and solutions for reconciliation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Prosecutor v. Tadic, 10 August 1995, ICTY (Trial Chamber, Decision on Defence Mo-
tion on Jurisdiction) Case No. IT-94-1, para. 42. 
12 I choose not to develop other mechanisms such as education etc that I find to have little 
to do with the legal question I intend to provide an answer to. 
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2.3 South Africa 
 
When the appalling apartheid rule of South Africa ended in the early 1990’s 
many wanted to set up a tribunal to punish the perpetrators of serious crimes 
during the apartheid era. However, the prime minister at the time Nelson 
Mandela decided to adhere to the compromise negotiated before the change 
of powers and decided to establish a TRC. The transitional process towards 
democracy in the country, when the leaving government cooperated with the 
new, was the immediate reason why the decision to create a TRC and grant 
amnesties for these crimes was decided upon. Such political decision was 
deemed necessary at the time and the decision was further legitimised since 
the decision maker Nelson Mandela himself was a victim of apartheid. 
 
2.3.1 The Nature of the South African TRC 
 
The South African TRC started its work in 1996; the objective was to come 
to terms with the nature, causes and extent of the gross human rights abuses 
under apartheid.13 It was based on the Promotion on National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act from 1995.14 The Commission was based on three com-
mittees: the Amnesty Committee, the Reparation and Rehabilitation Com-
mittee and the Human Rights Violations Committee. Amnesties were 
granted if certain criteria were fulfilled: 
• The incident for which the applicant requests an amnesty should be 
associated with a political motive, 
• The incident must have taken place within the time-limit; 1 March 
1960- 5 December 1993 (Later extended to 10 May 1994), 
• The applicant should fall within a number of prescribed categories, 
principally supporters, members or employees of the parties in-
volved in the political conflict of South Africa, 
• The incident should comply with criteria for an act associated with a 
political motive, 
• The applicant should give a full disclosure of the incidents for which 
he was seeking amnesty.15 
 
The commissioners should be impartial and without a high political profile, 
not more than two were allowed to be non South African citizens.16  
 
                                                 
13 Promotion on National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34, No. 1111, 26 July 1995 
14 <www.gov.za/reports/2003/trc>Last accessed 27 July 2004. 
15 Promotion on National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34, No. 1111, 26 July 1995, 
Sections 16-22. 
16 Promotion on National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34, No. 1111, 26 July 1995, 
Article 7 (2) b.   
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2.3.2  Response to the South African TRC 
 
The situation in South Africa differs from the other examples in two impor-
tant aspects. The apartheid era covers a period of approximately 50 years, 
which makes more traditional accountability measures such as prosecution 
difficult and even arbitrary as to who is indicted. Another difference is the 
legal status of the crime of apartheid at the time; it lacked judicial prece-
dents and it was codified in the course of the crimes being committed.17 
Even though the creation of the Convention on the Suppression and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Apartheid did make apartheid an international 
crime that appends an obligation to prosecute18, the United Nations (herein-
after the UN) choose not to persuade prosecutions for perpetrators of crimes 
of apartheid at the time. Instead, it allowed South Africa to determine how 
to comprehend the past atrocities without considerable foreign interven-
tion.19 Although several NGOs made reservations to the South African am-
nesty process, the international community has generally welcomed this 
decision, many have called it the one successful truth commission and it has 
served as a model for other commissions.20 It has not been as well received 
internally in South Africa but victims and their families have inter alia 
questioned the granting of amnesties in national courts.21 Reasons for the 
disapproval of the amnesty laws derive from the injustice the granting of an 
amnesty provokes, as it withholds responsible for serious crimes from jus-
tice.  
 
 
2.4 Rwanda 
 
More than 800.000 Rwandans were murdered during those 100 sinister days 
of the spring of 1994.22 The amount of persons lost is so high it is impossi-
ble to grasp and, consequently the number of perpetrators is considerable. 
The crime of genocide has a peremptory character and there is a global duty 
                                                 
17 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3068 on 23 November 1973. 
18 ibid, Article 4(2). 
19 Elimination of Apartheid and Establishment of a united, democratic and non-racial 
South Africa, United Nations General Assembly Res/48/159 20 Dec 1993. 
20 John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: the South African Experience, Vol. 277, 1998 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Symposium: International Human Rights 
at Fifty, <web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR530012003?open&of=ENG-ZAF>, Last 
accessed 8 September 2004. Ghana is an example of a State with a TRC modelled after the 
South African, <http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/1827.cfm> Last accessed 8 September 
2004. 
21 Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 
25July 1996, Constitutional Court of South Africa, SALR at 687, para. 25 
<www.concourt.gov.za/judgment.php?case_id=11939>Last accessed 4 November 2004. 
22 Report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the geno-
cide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257. 
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to prosecute or extradite for prosecution perpetrators of this crime.23 Hence, 
bringing genocidaires to justice is the responsibility of the whole interna-
tional community. Accordingly, in 1994 the UN established the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter the Rwanda Tribunal)24. 
Today 9 cases have been completed and 11 are on appeal.25 In the national 
Rwandan courts, 2500 persons have been tried and sentenced for genocide 
during this period according to the official website of the government of 
Rwanda.26 However the system has proven too slow as more than 110.000 
persons are detained in the overcrowded prisons.27 The unsustainable situa-
tion has led to the creation of a new form of courts, Gacaca tribunals, which 
aim at speeding up the pace. 
 
2.4.1 The Rwanda Tribunal  
 
The UN Security Council created the Rwanda Tribunal in November 1994, 
The tribunal is located in Arusha in Tanzania.28 All judges are international, 
7 of the 20 judges origin from Africa. The convicted include the former 
Prime Minister Jean Kambanda, several high-profile politicians and persons 
involved in the media.29 The Rwanda Tribunal has jurisdictional primacy in 
relation to national courts.30
 
Main critics of the tribunal relate to its costly and slow procedure and to the 
fact that it is not sufficiently linked to Rwanda to be able to provide for rec-
onciliation in that country. There has been extensive critique about that the 
Tribunal, unlike the national Rwandese courts, one, does not provide for 
death penalty and two, that the prisons provided for after sentence are of a 
higher standard than national prisons since the consequence of this is that 
the suspects and perpetrators of the most serious crimes have advantages 
that suspects and perpetrators of less serious crimes lack.   
 
                                                 
23 See inter alia; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment for the Crime of Genocide, 
9 December 1948, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment on 
the Crime of Genocide , 28 May 1951, International Court of Justice (Advisory Opinion) 
I.C.J. Reports 1951, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Hercegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) 11 July 1996, 
International Court of Justice, Judgment,, I.C.J. Reports 1996. 
24 Security Council, S/Res/955 (1994) of 6 November 1994. 
25<www.ictr.org/default.htm>, Last accessed 8 September 2004. 
26<www.rwanda1.com>, Last accessed 8 September 2004.  
27<www.amnestyusa.org/countries/rwanda/document.do?id=80256AB9000584F680256C8
C005E4CC6> Last accessed 8 September 2004. 
28 Security Council Resolution 955, 3453rd Meeting, 8 November 1994.  
29 <www.ictr.org/default.htm> Last accessed 8 September 2004. 
30 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, as amended by Resolution 955 
(1994), 977 (1995), 978 (1995), 1165 (1998), 1166 (1998), 1329 (2000), 1411 (2002) and 
1431 (2002), Article 8 (2). 
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2.4.2 Gacaca Courts 
 
The Rwandan government has divided the genocidaires into four different 
categories. The suspected planners, organizers, instigators and leaders be-
long to category 1 and will be tried in national courts. The alleged perpetra-
tors of slightly less serious crimes, belonging to categories 2-4, will be tried 
in Gacaca courts. The Gacaca Courts are based on a participatory justice 
system that is modelled after a traditional Rwandese method of resolving 
conflicts. The perpetrators give a full confession of the incident; give apolo-
gies and some sort of reparation to victims and/or their families. The non-
professional community-elected ‘judges’ can impose prison penalties, but 
not death penalty.31   
 
2.4.3 Response to the Gacaca courts 
 
Advantages of Gacaca trials include, reviving the traditional Rwandan na-
ture of the prosecution and emphasising the local capacity to deal with these 
crimes. Further possible positive consequences would be the facilitation of 
reconciliation by revealing the truth of the conditions of the genocide and to 
avoid an environment of impunity.32  
 
Critics to the Gacaca system emphasise the possible failure of due process 
and, being set up by the government, the risk of bias.33
 
In my opinion the establishment of Gacaca courts demonstrates some im-
portant issues relating to the current problem. The difficulties with holding a 
large number of perpetrators accountable could result in a process that does 
not live up to human rights standards of a fair trial. Another issue is the na-
tional versus the international system. A domestic process can more easily 
involve the Rwandese people and thus be an effective tool in the reconcilia-
tion process. Then again, in an international process the fear of biased 
judges and victor’s justice is avoided and the international fight against im-
punity is better served, as the international community tend to demonstrate 
more acceptance to and confidence in international justice. I avoid making a 
statement of the validity and sustainability of the Gacaca courts because I 
think it would be premature to pass any judgement.  
 
                                                 
31 Website of Penal Reform International 
<www.penalreform.org/english/theme_gacaca.htm#top>, Last accessed 4 November 2004. 
32 Website of the Republic of Rwanda 
 <www.rwanda1.com/government/justice.htm> Last accessed 4 November 2004. 
33 inter alia Rachel Rinaldo, Can the Gacaca Courts Deliver Justice?, 8 April 2004 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/rwanda/2004/0408justice.htm>Last 
accessed 9 September 2004.  
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2.5 Sierra Leone 
 
Civil war raged Sierra Leone for 11 years, from 1991 to 2002. The conflict 
was principally fought between government forces and the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF). Approximately 60.000 people were killed in the con-
flict34 and massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law have 
been reported.35 In June 1999 the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed be-
tween the government of Sierra Leone and RUF under the auspices of the 
UN.36 An amnesty provision was included for all crimes committed during 
the conflict.37 In accordance with this provision a TRC was created and it 
functions parallel with a Special Court that the UN and the government of 
Sierra Leone jointly set up in 2002.38  
 
The attorney general and minister of justice of Sierra Leone, Solomon 
Berewa, stated that the main reason for why there was no provision on judi-
cial accountability included in the peace agreement was for fear of hinder-
ing the peace negotiations. Mr. Berewa continued saying that “The view 
that truth is as good as justice also implies that knowledge of the truth is the 
most important part of a process of healing and uniting the country.”39
 
When signing the peace agreement the UN Special Representative of the 
Secretary General for Sierra Leone attached to his signature a condition that 
the amnesty provision was not to apply to genocide, crimes against human-
ity and serious violations of international humanitarian law. As a conse-
quence of this opinion, in the course of the establishment of the Special 
Court the Sierra Leone government and the UN agreed on the current article 
10 of the statute of the court which gives the court the possibility to try 
crimes against humanity and serious violations of humanitarian law to 
which an amnesty previously has been granted.40 According to UN Under-
Secretary General Hans Corell this provision is a consistent effect since 
amnesties for the current crimes are incompatible with international law.41
                                                 
34 William Reno, Sierra Leone, <un-
pan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan016206.pdf>, Last accessed 
8 September 2004. 
35 See inter alia; Human Rights Watch Report, 
<www.hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/31/rwanda7009.htm> Last revised 9 September 2004. 
36 Peace agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United 
Front of Sierra Leone <www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html> Last accessed 8 Septem-
ber 2004. 
37 Ibid part 3, article IX.  
38 <www.sc-sl.org> Last accessed 8 September 2004. 
39 Solomon Berewa, Addressing impunity using divergent approaches; the Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission and the Special Court. <www.sierra-leone.org/trcbook-
solomonberewa.html > Last accessed 8 September 2004. 
40 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, (S-2000-915) para. 24. 
41 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, (S-2000-915) para. 24.  
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2.5.1 The Relationship between the Special Court and the 
TRC 
 
As the name reveals the purpose of the TRC is to bring out the truth of the 
past, as a way to reconcile with the past for victims but also for the perpetra-
tors. A further purpose is to prevent future atrocities by demonstrating the 
will of Sierra Leone to hold perpetrators accountable. The subject at target 
is a great part of the people of Sierra Leone. Although the commission has 
international representatives it is a domestic forum.42 The functioning of the 
Commission is constructed on the idea that perpetrators and victims want to 
tell their stories and that the telling fulfils a purpose on its own. 
 
The purpose of the Special Court on the other hand is punitive and the sub-
jects are “those who bear the greatest responsibility or are most responsible 
for the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law 
in Sierra Leone”.43 The objective is to implement accountability for interna-
tional crimes to prevent the former leaders of the country from repeating the 
atrocities committed and thus bring instability back into the country. An-
other purpose aims at the national reconciliation and restoration since the 
war; it seeks to strengthen the belief in the rule of law but is also a way for 
the international community as a whole to find a way to prevent such 
crimes.44  
 
The TRC and the Special Court act separately although their goals and pur-
poses correspond.45 According to Sierra Leonean law the TRC is, as an in-
stitution created under national law, under a duty to cooperate with the Spe-
cial Court.46 I believe there is a risk that such subsidiary position could 
undermine the work of the TRC, as people would fear to step forward and 
tell their stories if this could lead to a later information sharing to the Court 
and consequently possibly to prosecution or other use by the Court.  
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 <www.sierra-leone.org/trc-trcforsierraleone.html > Last accessed 8 September 2004. 
43 Statute of Special Court for Sierra Leone, < http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html > Last 
accessed 8 September 2004. 
44 Website of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
<www.sc-sl.org> Last accessed 4 November 2004.  
45 Website of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
<www.sc-sl.org> Last accessed 4 November 2004.  
46 Human Rights Watch Policy Paper on the Interrelationship Between the Special court of 
Sierra Leone and Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
<www.hrw.org/press/2002/04/sierraleoneTRC0418.htm>Last accessed 8 September 2004. 
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2.5.2 Responses to the Relationship Between the Special 
Court and the TRC  
 
An investigation made by the Sierra Leonean NGO PRIDE (Post-Conflict 
Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment)47 shows that 
there is generally a lack of support by ex-combatants for the information 
sharing between the TRC and the Special Court. The reason asserted by 
PRIDE is that the questioned want to witness before the TRC because they 
believe it could help promote reconciliation, but they fear the negative con-
sequences that could come from the Special Court.48 This apprehension has 
been rejected by William Schabas, who is a commissioner of the Sierra 
Leone TRC. He suggests that people’s desire to air past experiences prevails 
over their fear of prosecution.49  
 
 
2.6 Conclusion Case Studies 
 
Would the South African apartheid regime have continued committing 
atrocities if it would not have been for the decision to grant amnesties? 
Could further atrocities in Sierra Leone have been avoided if the Lomé 
peace Agreement had not provided for amnesties?  It is not possible to find 
answers to such questions. Nor is it easy to know what will be the proper 
solution in the future when a choice has to be made whether to prosecute or 
to grant amnesties.  
 
Nevertheless, we can observe and learn from the decisions above and we 
can perceive the main problems. Past experiences show that the main rea-
sons for the choice not to prosecute are political (like in South Africa or 
Sierra Leone) or practical (like in Rwanda). The choices are individualised; 
they are based on the prerequisites for the country in question. As such the 
decisions are thus highly of a political character, something which the ICC 
seeks to avoid.  
 
In his inauguration speech the Chairman of the Sierra Leone TRC Rev. Dr. 
Joseph Humper reflected upon the TRC in relation to it being modelled after 
the South African TRC and he stated that the Sierra Leonean TRC is 
“uniquely Sierra Leonean, at all times guided by what is in the best interest 
                                                 
47 A Sierra Leone NGO working for lasting peace by restructuring the socio-economic 
realities for ex-combatants and other war-affected parties. 
<www.ictj.org/downloads/PRIDE%20report.pdf> Last accessed 8 September 2004. 
48 A study by PRIDE in partnership with the International Center for Transitional Justice 
Ex-Combatant Views on the Truth Commission and the Special Court in Sierra Leone, 
<www.ictj.org/downloads/PRIDE%20report.pdf> p.25, Last accessed 8 September 2004. 
49 ASIL conference Washington DC, 1 April 2004, personal note. 
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of the people of Sierra Leone”.50 This is a fundamental observation regard-
ing the reconciliation labour after any conflict. It also emphasises where 
national labour differs from international work against impunity. While rec-
onciliation is the main objective with a TRC it is one of several objectives 
with a prosecution in a court.  
 
This observation is important to acknowledge when analysing the principle 
of complementarity of the Rome Statute. The result of different accountabil-
ity methods will indirectly affect the determination whether a State is un-
willing in its investigation of alleged war crimes and thus consequently, the 
decision of admissibility of a case before the ICC. Past experiences can pro-
vide for information about the flaws and benefits of different methods and 
consequently whether alternative accountability measures meet the legal 
standards of an investigation according to article 17 of the Rome Statute. 
This leads us into the next chapter that accounts for different types of am-
nesties and what standards the various kinds meet. 
                                                 
50 Address by Rt Rev. Dr. Joseph Humper, chairman, Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion, on the occasion of the inauguration of the commission on Friday 5th July 2002 
<www.sierra-leone.org/josephhumper070502.html> Last accessed 9 September 2004. 
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3 Amnesty 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
When investigating if a national amnesty bars an ICC prosecution, accord-
ing to the principle of complementarity, it is necessary to recognize that, due 
to the terms of its set-up; the conformity of an amnesty with international 
law can vary. Consequently, the answer to the question put above could be 
different depending on the character of the amnesty. In this chapter I present 
different kinds of amnesties with the intention to crystallise which elements 
influence the determination of its consistency with international law and 
consequently the Rome Statute. 
 
The international community has been increasingly reluctant to accept the 
use of amnesties for war crimes. The reasons are principally dictators’ mis-
use of amnesties and the internationalization of crimes. The extent of the 
development to prohibit amnesties for international crimes is however un-
clear. In the course of this discussion it is important to distinguish between 
certain types of amnesties. 
 
3.2 Blanket Amnesties 
 
The granting of blanket amnesties and self-proclaimed amnesties for crimes 
under the ICC’s jurisdiction is incompatible with international law and the 
Rome Statute as it provides for impunity for war criminals; something that 
counteracts a general international obligation51 and a duty upon all Member 
States of the Rome Statute to prosecute war crimes.52 An amnesty that is not 
the result of a thorough investigation is intrinsically incompatible with such 
an obligation. Blanket amnesties may have considerable negative conse-
quences as they may well fail to protect the rights of the victims and could 
jeopardise a lasting peace or a meaningful reconciliation of a country.53  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Infra section 4.1. 
52 Non-operative paragraph 4, Rome Statute. 
53 Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court (Oxford 
University Press, Great Britain, 2003) pp. 94-95  (hereinafter Broomhall).                                                                          
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3.3 Conditional Amnesties 
 
Viewed generally, the process, often led by a TRC, leading up to the grant-
ing of amnesties should fulfil certain criteria to gain any acceptance in the 
international community: 
 
1. The investigation should have a quasi-judicial character; public 
hearings should be held and victims should have the right to testify.  
2. The commission should be established by a democratically elected 
regime.  
3. The commission should be an independent body and commissioners 
should be independent from government. It should also be seen to be 
of such a character; that is the commissioners should ethnically and 
politically represent the population. 
4. The commission should have a broad mandate and be adequately fi-
nanced and resourced to enable it to make a full and effective inves-
tigation of all forms of inter alia gross human rights violations.   
5. The investigation should be aimed at providing for justice; the per-
petrators of the abuses should be named, provided adequate oppor-
tunity is given to them to challenge their accusers. There should also 
be a possibility for the commission to recommend compensation to 
victims.  
6. The commission should, within a reasonable time, submit a compre-
hensive report aimed at preventing the abuses.  
7. There should be a possibility to refuse amnesties; no amnesty should 
be allowed to perpetrators of human rights violations who refuse to 
co-operate with the commission in providing a comprehensive pic-
ture of the wrongs of the past.54 
8. The aim should be to provide for international peace and security 
and the process of transition would be jeopardised without the am-
nesty.55 
9. There should be safeguards for victims and witnesses.56 
 
                                                 
54 1-5 are included in John Dugard and Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interest of Justice: 
Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court p. 497-498, European 
Journal of International Law Vol. 14 No 3 criteria lists while 6-7 exclusively appear in 
John Dugard, “Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience”,  Transnational 
Law and Contemporary Problems, fall 1998, p. 289. 
55 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8 are included in Andreas O’Shea’s Draft Protocol to the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court on the Proper Limitations to Municipal Amnesties Promul-
gated in Times of Transition in Andreas O’Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International Law 
and Practice (Kluwer Law International, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2004) pp. 330-336 
(hereinafter O’Shea). 
56 1, 3, 6 and 9 are mentioned in Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights 
Violations (Civil and Political), E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.12 October 1997, the Revised 
final report prepared by Mr Joinet pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 1996/119, paras. 
19-24. 
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I will in chapter 6 of this thesis present the criteria I prefer for the granting 
of amnesties. My conclusion corresponds in general with the present list; 
however I would like to make a reservation relating to point 2 as I find it to 
have an unfortunate phrasing. The rationale of this provision is to gain a 
strong support for the amnesty within the population at large. This could be 
satisfied by point 3 of the list and by ensuring that all parties of a conflict 
are represented at the negotiations. I think the focus on a ‘democratically 
elected regime’ could be unfortunate, as it tends to exclude certain States 
from the ‘legitimate sphere’ of international law. Another regrettable effect 
with this provision could be that the commission and its composition could 
become a political rather than a legal issue.  
 
3.4 Article 6 (5) Amnesties 
 
Article 6 (5) of the Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Conventions 
reads; “At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to 
grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the 
armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the 
armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.” 57
 
Although article 6 (5) of Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions does not explicitly refer to a certain type of amnesties I believe it to be 
useful to reflect upon the article in this context as the article is repeatedly 
used as a means to defend the granting of amnesties. Article 6(5) encourages 
authorities to, by the end of the (non-international) conflict, grant amnesties 
for combatants. 
 
The validity of applying this argument to defend amnesties for war crimes 
can however be seriously questioned. The interpretation by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross demonstrates that the amnesties referred to in 
the Protocol are amnesties for acts that violate national, not international, 
law. Thus, the amnesty contemplated upon in article 6 (5) is not intended to 
lead to impunity for serious offences against humanitarian law. The subjects 
of the 6 (5) amnesties are those detained only because they participated in 
the hostilities not those suspected of having violated international law.58  
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Article 6 (5), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of the Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
II), 8 June 1977. 
58 Frits Karlshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 3  Ed, 2001) p. 150.rd
 24
3.5 Conclusion amnesty 
 
The outcome of an assessment of the relation between the principle of com-
plementarity and amnesties could vary regarding whether the amnesty in 
question is a blanket amnesty or a conditional amnesty. Thus, it is important 
to understand and recognize the structures and characteristics of a particular 
amnesty when investigating the admissibility of a case, where an amnesty 
has been granted, before the ICC.  
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4 Obstacles for the Granting of 
Amnesties in International Law 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
 
The Rome Statute does not mention amnesties. Accordingly, we must look 
elsewhere for guidance when investigating amnesties and the principle of 
complementarity. As a part of international law it is essential that the Rome 
Statute is in harmony with relevant rules in this system. Consequently, the 
court when making its decisions shall apply relevant treaties and the princi-
ples and rules of international law.59
 
I will in the following chapter present three possible theories to explain why 
amnesties could be incompatible with international law. The first is the ob-
ligation to prosecute certain crimes. Following this I will demonstrate how 
the special character of a rule could have a fundamental importance for the 
recognition of amnesties for acts contrary to such a rule. Finally, I will 
elaborate on whether amnesties for war crimes are reconcilable with certain 
human rights norms. 
 
  
4.2 An Absolute Aut Dedere Aut Judicare in 
Treaty and/or Customary Law? 
 
A potential obstacle for the granting of amnesties would be an absolute in-
ternational obligation to prosecute war criminals. Such a duty would be in-
compatible with any granting of a national amnesty. 
 
There is a duty to prosecute or extradite grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions enshrined in articles 49, 50, 129 and 146 of the four conven-
tions respectively.60 The Geneva Conventions have 191 parties; all member 
States of the UN are included. This high number indicates that the opinio 
juris of States is favourable for the existence of a parallel customary rule. In 
the Nicaragua Case the International Court of Justice (ICJ) described the 
obligation to respect and ensure the respect for the Geneva Conventions as 
                                                 
59 Article 21, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
60 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Convention (III) relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War. Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In 
Time of War. Geneva 12 August 1949. 
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international customary law.61 Further, the obligation to prosecute or extra-
dite war criminals has been reiterated in a number of UN General Assembly 
resolutions.62 Though these resolutions are not binding on the member 
States they “may have a normative value […] they are considered evidence 
for an existing rule or opinio juris for the emergence of a new one”.63 An-
other indication of the customary status for this obligation is its inclusion by 
the International Law Commission (ILC) in the Draft Code on Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind.64 The Rome Statute of the ICC 
also points in the same direction as it enshrines the duty in question.65
 
The Rome Statute differs from the Geneva Conventions as it attaches the 
duty to prosecute or extradite also to other war crimes than grave breaches 
of the conventions, that is to serious war crimes committed in non-
international conflicts as well as those committed in international conflicts. 
States have traditionally been reluctant to extend obligations concerning 
internal conflicts, and the Rome Statute was not a codification of existing 
customary rules in this matter. However, there has been a development in 
international law towards a blurring of the rules for international and non-
international conflicts. In the Tadic Case the Yugoslavian tribunal stated 
that the commission of serious war crimes attach criminal responsibility also 
when the crimes were perpetrated in non-international armed conflicts. The 
court admitted the development towards an obligation but noted that this 
rule was still emerging. Also in the statute of the Rwanda tribunal war 
crimes committed in the internal conflict of the country are included as ap-
pending responsibility. Further, the growing practice by States to prosecute 
perpetrators in internal conflicts is further evidence. Also, national legisla-
tions, such as the Spanish and German, extending the possibility to prose-
cute internal conflicts’ war crimes committed outside the country in ques-
tion indicate the disappearance of a legal distinction between these two con-
cepts.66
 
However, international customary law is still unclear in whether to attach an 
obligation to prosecute or extradite non-international conflicts’ war crimi-
nals. Such confusion is, as mentioned, avoided in the Rome Statute. 
 
                                                 
61 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America) 27 June 1986, International Court of Justice, I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 
220. 
62 See inter alia General Assembly Resolution 3074 (1973) and General Assembly Resolu-
tion 41/160 (1986). 
63 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 July 1996, International Court of 
Justice (Advisory Opinion) I.C.J. Reports 1996. 
64 International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, 48th Session, 1996, (A/48/10), articles 8-9. 
65 Preamble and article 1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
66 Gesetz zur Einführung des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches, Bundesgesetzblatt 2002, Teil I., No. 
42, 29 June 2002, Chapter 2, Section 8 and De los delitos contra las personas y bienes 
protegidos en caso de Ley Orgánica del Código Penal de 23 de noviembre, 10/1995, Bo-
letín Oficial del Estado, No. 281, 24 November 1995, Articles 608-614. All available at: 
<www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/WebLAW?OpenView>Last accessed 9 September 2004. 
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The argument could be made that even if an obligation to prosecute or ex-
tradite suspected war criminals could be established it is possible with ex-
ceptions to such. Consequently, it could be argued that an internationally 
accepted amnesty could constitute such an exception.  
 
4.3 Does the Legal Character of the Crime 
Prevent Amnesties? 
 
A further obstacle for the granting of amnesties for war crimes in interna-
tional law could be the consequences of the characterisation of war crimes 
as jus cogens crimes in international customary law. 
 
4.3.1 The Legal Character of War Crimes 
 
The legal character of war crimes has been a matter of dispute; the reason is 
that such categorization would attach certain consequences. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties67 states that a treaty contrary to a “per-
emptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)” is void.68 Another, 
opinion was expressed by the Yugoslavian tribunal in the Furundzija case; 
that one of the consequences of a norm having the character of jus cogens is 
that an amnesty cannot be given for such a crime.69 I will return to this last 
consequence but first I will investigate if war crimes have this special status.  
 
Certain fundamental rules are considered as overriding principles of jus co-
gens. They are the concern of all States or the international community as a 
whole. These rules cannot be derogated from and they take precedence 
when colliding with more ordinary rules of international law.70 Unlike the 
creation of ordinary customary rules jus cogens rules require, apart from 
state practice and opinio juris, an additional opinio juris that the rule in 
question constitutes jus cogens.  
  
The ICJ has avoided this term in connection with war crimes, although the 
court touched upon it when it noted that the prohibition of such crimes con-
stitute “intransgressible principles of international law”.71 However, war 
                                                 
67 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 May 1969, article 53. 
68 Unfortunately the International Law Commission preferred not to define the term in the 
commentary to the convention “Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties”, p. 11, Yearbook of the ILC (1966).  
69 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 10 December 1998, ICTY (Trial Chamber, II Judgement) Case 
No. IT-95-17/1, para 155. 
70 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press Inc., 
Oxford-New York, 2003) pp. 597-598. 
71 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, 8 July 1996, International Court 
of Justice (Advisory Opinion) §79 “Further these fundamental rules are to be observed by 
all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they 
constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.” 
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crimes have explicitly been considered to constitute jus cogens by the 
Yugoslavian tribunal.72 This has also been stated by national courts73 and by 
many international legal scholars.74  
 
In my opinion it is not premature to include grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions to the list of jus cogens crimes. The history of abolishing war 
crimes goes far back in time and there has been a general consensus within 
the international community to bring to an end the worst atrocities of war.75 
However, considering the rapid but more recent development in interna-
tional criminal law concerning war crimes committed in non-international 
conflicts I would hesitate to define such war crimes as part of the peremp-
tory norms.76  
 
The point is that there is possibly a distinct legal character between war 
crimes committed in international conflicts and those committed in non-
international conflicts where the former constitute jus cogens but the latter 
do not.77 Consequently, the effects presented below in section 4.2.2-4.2.4 
would relate only to the war crimes committed in international, but not non-
international, armed conflicts that is; the war crimes defined in articles 8 (2) 
a and b but not to those defined in articles 8 (2) c and e of the Rome Statute. 
However strange this distinction may seem it is a reality deriving from the 
sovereignty of States. The acts committed can be identical and the victims 
and even the perpetrators the same persons but depending on the legal defi-
nition of the conflict the character of the crime vary and so do the conse-
quences, on State and individual level, of the commission of such a crime. 
 
At the 1966 conference on international law Professor Katz accurately 
stated,  in connection with the concept of jus cogens, that there was a gen-
eral agreement that law did not exist regardless of its application. He con-
tinued “[i]f we could identify the principles we still had to find out how they 
                                                 
72 Prosecutor v. Kuprescic et al, 14 January 2000, ICTY, (Trial Chamber) § 520 “most 
norms of international humanitarian law, in particular those prohibiting war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide, are also peremptory norms of international law or 
jus cogens, i.e. of a non-derogable and overriding character”.  
73 Haas and Prieke case, 7 March 1998/ 16 November 1998, Military Court of Appeal of 
Rome/ Supreme Court of cassation, “non-applicability of statutory limitations of war 
crimes as a principle of jus cogens  character” <www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/0/0370fc2730b3776c1256c8c0055e44d?OpenDocument> Last accessed 8 Septem-
ber 2004. 
74 Inter alia Conference on International Law Lagonissi (Greece) April 3-8 1966, The Con-
cept of Jus Cogens in International Law, (Carnegie Andowment for International Peace, 
Geneva, 1967) p. 13, 82. 
75 Inter alia the “Lieber Code“ dating from 1864 and the American Civil War or the “Mar-
tens Clause” from the conference in the Hague in 1899; Frits Karlshoven and Liesbeth 
Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War (International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Geneva, 3  Ed, 2001) pp. 19-26.rd   
76 See inter alia Prosecutor v. Tadic, 10 August 1995, ICTY (Trial Chamber, Decision on 
Defence Motion on Jurisdiction) Case No. IT-94-1.   
77 Articles 8 (2) a and b and 8 (2) c, d, and e respectively, Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. 
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could be applied.” 78 Hence, I will in the following investigate possible legal 
consequences of labelling a norm jus cogens. 
 
 
4.3.2 Erga Omnes Effects of the Jus Cogens Character- the 
‘Furundzija Theory’ 
 
The Yugoslavian Tribunal states in the Furundzija case that: “The fact that 
torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law has other 
effects at inter- state and individual levels. At the inter-state level, it serves 
to internationally de-legitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial act 
authorising torture. It would be senseless to argue, on the one hand, that on 
account of the jus cogens value of the prohibition against torture, treaties or 
customary rules providing for torture would be null and void ab initio, and 
then be unmindful of a State say, taking national measures authorising or 
condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators through an amnesty law. If 
such a situation were to arise, the national measures, violating the general 
principle and any relevant treaty provision, would produce the legal effects 
discussed above and in addition would not be accorded international legal 
recognition.”79  
 
While the Furundzija case in the Yugoslavian tribunal concerned the crime 
of torture the analysis about jus cogens made by the court in that case is also 
relevant for the case of war crimes as it is a crime with the same legal char-
acter. In the Furundzija judgement the Yugoslavian tribunal stated that to 
avoid making the jus cogens prohibition meaningless, the granting of an 
amnesty for a jus cogens crime is not possible. The tribunal presupposed 
that the character of the crimes attaches certain consequences. It seems to 
have been the opinion of the court that the granting of amnesties encouraged 
prohibited behaviour and thus conflicted with the prohibition. Consequently, 
as a rule conflicting with jus cogens, the amnesty provision would be void 
according to the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties.80  
 
However, as the Yugoslavian Tribunal neither makes a decision upon am-
nesties nor specifies the type of amnesty in the relevant case the decision 
does not necessarily give an answer to the relation of amnesties as a bar to 
admitting a case before the ICC. 
 
The contention made in the Furundzija case is far from uncontested. Many 
international legal scholars argue that there is nothing in the concept of jus 
cogens that presupposes erga omnes obligations, that the jus cogens charac-
                                                 
78 Conference on International Law Lagonissi (Greece) April 3-8 1966, The Concept of Jus 
Cogens in International Law, (Carnegie Andowment for International Peace, Geneva, 
1967) p. 114. 
79 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 10 December 1998, ICTY (Trial Chamber, II Judgement) Case 
No. IT-95-17/1, para. 155. 
80 Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties of 22 May 1969. 
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ter relates to the prohibition and cannot be extended without further State 
consent. Defenders of this theory point the State consent out as something 
exceptional and fundamental in international law. They claim that no com-
mon organization can exist that can sanction acts contrary to international 
law without a prior agreement of such. This line of argumentation asserts 
that only an exhortation to commit a crime against a jus cogens norm would 
conflict with such a norm, since this is a consequence agreed upon through 
the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties.81
 
However, some authors have instead based the theory of the expansion of 
the concept of erga omnes on the lack of a central authority, as referred to 
above, that controls and sanctions breaches of jus cogens norms.82 Without 
such, States have assumed the right to take action against breaches against 
jus cogens norms.  
 
Other authors have reached similar conclusions; one of the firmest interna-
tional criminal law promoters Professor Cherif Bassiouni has stated that 
“the establishment of a permanent international criminal court having inher-
ent jurisdiction over these crimes is a convincing argument for the proposi-
tion that crimes such as […] war crimes […] are part of jus cogens and that 
obligations erga omnes flow from them”. 83 He affirms that the non-
applicability of amnesties is one of the legal obligations, which arise from 
jus cogens crimes.84 The defenders of this link between jus cogens and erga 
omnes tend to use this rather vague language that the duty in question “fol-
lows”, “follows logically” upon the prohibition or that the concepts are two 
sides of one coin.85  
 
The effect of the interpretations made by these distinguished scholars and, 
according to me, by the Yugoslavian tribunal relating to the principle of 
complementarity would be that only a national investigation leading to 
prosecution, thus not an amnesty, could bar an ICC prosecution for war 
crimes committed in an international conflict. Any other interpretation 
                                                 
81 Inter alia Gennady M. Danilenko, International Jus cogens: Issues of Law-making, 
1991, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 2 No.1 
<www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3-01.html#TopOfPage > Last accessed 8 November. 
See especially the discussion on positivist theory and law making. 
82 Kerstin Barsch and Björn Elberling, Jus Cogens vs.State Immunity, Round Two: The 
Decision of the Europen Court of Human Rights in the Kalogeropoulou et al. v. Greece 
and Germany Decision, German Law Journal, Vol. 04 No. 05, p.486. 
83 Cherif Bassiouni, Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 1996 Vol. 59 Law and Con-
temporary Problems  
<http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/articles/lcp59dFall1996p63.htm> Last accessed 8 
November 2004, p. 272.  
84 supra, p. 266, see also Broomhall, ibid fn 53, p. 56. 
85 See Dissenting Opinion of judge Ferrari-Bravo in Al-Adsani v. the U.K., ECHR, 21 No-
vember 2001, (Judgement) Application no 00035763/97, para. 61, Lyal S. Sunga, The 
Emerging System of International Criminal Law, (Kluwer Law International, The Nether-
lands, 1997) and Michael Byers, “Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens 
and Erga Omnes Rules”, Nordic Journal of International Law, 1997, vol. 66, no. 2-3, pp. 
211-239(29), respectively. 
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would be impossible as it would be contrary to a jus cogens norm and thus 
void.  
 
Critics of the ‘Furundzija theory’ would on the other hand claim that the 
character of a crime as jus cogens does not have any other ‘logical’ effects 
than those agreed upon in the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties.86  
 
Essentially this conflict concerns State sovereignty. If the character of a rule 
affects its implementation irrespectively of if the States concerned have 
consented to this it is an infringement of a State’s sovereignty as it cuts back 
on that State’s judicial discretion. In my personal view this is neither a legal 
nor a practical problem. States have consented to the creation of the norm in 
question; they have further consented to its special character and have thus 
noticed the severity of the crimes in question and the importance of their 
eradication.  
 
Further, I cannot accept that practical difficulties would hinder erga omnes 
obligations to be imposed in this system. When arguing on the level of prin-
ciples I find this argument out of place, as it is important to define the goals 
to have any possibility to accomplish them. Additionally, there are few 
norms that have the status of jus cogens and consequently the obligations 
arising from those existing would not be overwhelming. 
 
4.3.3 The Obligation to Prosecute as Jus Cogens- ‘the AZAPO 
Theory’ 
 
The Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) brought, as discussed below, 
an application before the South African Courts against the President of 
South Africa and others. The applicants supported their case partly on an 
article by Professor Zyad Motala. In the article he states that the rule provid-
ing for rights to individual victims of war crimes is a peremptory norm. Pro-
fessor Motala further means that the granting of amnesties for war crimes, 
by the South African National Unity and Reconciliation Act (the Act), “vio-
lates a cardinal rule of international humanitarian law, namely that there can 
be no amnesty for war crimes”.87 This characterisation made by Professor 
Motala of the prohibition of amnesties as a peremptory norm of interna-
tional law was also reflected in the judgement.88 Although the case in ques-
tion concerned a civil action the argumentation is relevant also for a crimi-
                                                 
86 See supra fn 81. 
87 Ziyad Motala, The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, the Constitution 
and International Law, 1995 Vol. 28, Comparative and International Law Journal of South-
ern Africa p. 338-362.  
88 Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and others v. President of the Republic of South 
Africa et al, 25 July 1996, the Constitutional Court of South Africa (CCT17/96) 
<www.concourt.gov.za> or www.worldlii.org/za/cases/ZACC/>Last accessed 8 November 
2004. 
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nal case as it discusses the constitutionality of parts of the Act in relation to 
amnesties generally.  
 
Apart from being utterly bold I find the argumentation accounted for above 
to have a considerable flaw. It is in the very nature of a peremptory norm of 
international law that the international community as a whole explicitly ac-
cepts it. Thus it is not possible to ‘create’ such rules through deduction. If 
Professor Motala’s theory was applicable, that the obligation to prosecute 
war criminals would constitute jus cogens no amnesty for these crimes 
could ever be possible. The response by the international community has 
many times been less enthusiastic about amnesties than in the case of South 
Africa. However, it is far from abolishing all amnesties at all times. This is 
an indication of the international community’s lack of opinio juris for the 
prohibition of amnesties to be part of jus cogens. I think imposing a peremp-
tory character on the prosecution of war crimes would be a mistake that 
could jeopardize a fragile peace negotiation. It could also be negative for the 
authority of the concept of jus cogens as it would render impossible a strict 
concordance with article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on trea-
ties.  
 
4.3.4 Short Endnote on Jus Cogens  
 
The whole concept of jus cogens evidently reduces the sovereignty of States 
as it imposes obligations upon States from which they cannot derogate. The 
possible strengthening of the protection of certain jus cogens norms is co-
herent with the present development away from a prevailing focus on State 
sovereignty in international law. However, we must not forget that the very 
foundation of international law is still State consent and that international 
law is not what we want it to be but what States have agreed upon. An 
emerging law is just that- emerging and not yet quite established.  
 
Based on the theories presented above I personally believe the ‘Furundzija 
theory’ to be the most coherent. By attaching certain obligations to a per-
emptory norm of international the system of laws can be strengthened and 
developed without transgressing the fundamental principles of the creation 
of international law. 
 
 
 
4.4 Are Amnesties for War Crimes Incompatible 
with International Human Rights Law? 
 
The granting of amnesties could also be seen as contrary to several interna-
tional human rights norms of the victims. I will in the following present 
some of the available case law that supports this argumentation. 
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 4.4.1 The Azapo Case 
 
The Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo) brought in 1996 an appeal to 
the Constitutional Court in South Africa against the President of South Af-
rica and others.89 The organisation was active in the liberation movement of 
the country and members of Azapo and their families had been victims dur-
ing the apartheid era. The aim with the claim was to challenge the constitu-
tionality of parts of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act (the Act). 
Azapo claimed that the possibility to grant amnesties according to the Act 
conflicts with those provisions in the constitution that empowers the func-
tion of the judiciary and the powers of the courts to deal with disputes. One 
provision of possible conflict was the right for every person to have his or 
her disputes settled by a court of law.  
 
Although the court agreed that the right to access to a court was infringed by 
the act it held that this was a necessary measure to promote reconciliation in 
the country. It established that the issue for the court to determine was 
whether the act was in accordance with the constitution and not if it was in 
concord with international treaties and international customary law.90 The 
court continued by stating that an act of the parliament takes precedence if 
conflicting with an international rule.91 It concluded that the act was in ac-
cordance with the constitution. The language of the court focused on na-
tional reconciliation based on forgiveness and it thus avoids determining 
whether the Act contravenes international human rights treaties. 
 
The judgement may be applicable nationally in South Africa as it is in ac-
cordance with its constitution although it is not a valid decision in the inter-
national sphere. As the ICJ has stated it is a fundamental principle of inter-
national law that international law prevails over domestic law.92 This is a 
necessary rule for the operation of international law, without it any State 
could refer to its national regulations to avoid fulfilling its international ob-
ligations. In the current case the question if the South African amnesty law 
was legal according to international standards, whether the infringement of 
the individual’s human rights could be justified as a measure to maintain 
national peace, thus remains unanswered. However, there is one conclusion 
to be drawn from the decision that is of our interest; according to the South 
                                                 
89 Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and others v. President of the Republic of South 
Africa et al, 25 July 1996, the Constitutional Court of South Africa (CCT17/96) 
<www.concourt.gov.za> or <www.worldlii.org/za/cases/ZACC/>Last accessed 8 Novem-
ber 2004. 
(hereinafter Azapo v. President of the Republic of South Africa et al). 
90 Azapo v. President of the Republic of South Africa et al, supra fn 89, para. 26. 
91 Azapo v. President of the Republic of South Africa et al, ibid fn 89, para. 27. 
92 Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations 
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 26 April 1988, International Court of Justice, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1988 pp. 12, 34.  
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African court, the granting of amnesties was contrary to certain human 
rights norms.  
 
 
4.4.2 Latin American Case Law 
 
In Latin America, which has a vast history of amnesties, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (the Inter-American Court) and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (the IACHR) have been firm in their non-
acceptance of (self-proclaimed) amnesties for serious human rights crimes. 
 
In Argentina, the IACHR concluded that laws enacted to withdraw from 
prosecution persons responsible for atrocities committed during the ‘dirty 
war’ were incompatible with the right to a fair trial.93 Similar decisions were 
made in the cases of inter alia Uruguay, Chile and Peru.94 The Inter-
American Court on Human Rights has also reached this conclusion in a 
well-known case that I will account for below.95  
 
4.4.2.1 Barrios Altos Case 
 
 
In 1991, 15 persons were killed and 4 were injured in Barrios Altos in Lima, 
Peru. Judicial investigations and newspaper reports stated that the perpetra-
tors were members of the special military who were on an anti-terrorist mis-
sion, carrying out reprisals on members of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining 
Path). No serious investigations were carried out of the events until 1995 
when five army officials were accused as responsible for the events. Shortly 
after this the congress of Peru adopted an amnesty law, granted an amnesty 
for all those members of the security forces or civilians who were accused 
of having committed human rights offences between 1980 and 1995.96  
 
The IACHR submitted the case to the Inter-American Court in June 2000.97 
It requested the Inter-American Court to determine whether the State of 
Peru had violated amongst others the right to a fair trial (article 8 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights) and the right to judicial protection 
(article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights) as a consequence 
of the creation and application of the relevant amnesty law. 
                                                 
93 No 28/92 (Argentina) < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/28%5E92arg.pdf>. 
94 No 28/92 (Argentina) < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/28%5E92arg.pdf>, 29/92 
(Uruguay) <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/29%5E92urg.pdf> 36/96 (Chile) 
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/96port/Caso10843.htm> and 43/97 (Peru) 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/1997/peru43-97.html.All last accessed 8 November 
2004. 
95 Barrios Altos (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al v. Peru) 14 March 2001, Inter-American Court 
on Human Rights, Serie C No. 75 <www.corteidh.or.cr/seriec> (hereinafter Barrios Altos). 
96 Amnesty Law 26479. 
97 Barrios Altos,  ibid fn 95. 
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The court stated in its judgement that all amnesty provisions for violations 
of non-derogable human rights are inadmissible as they prevent the investi-
gation and punishment of those responsible for such crimes. The Inter-
American Court agreed in its judgement with the IACHR’s plea relating to 
the lack of a fair trial and judicial protection.  
 
Interestingly enough, the court then moves on to specify the amnesty in 
question. It states that self-amnesty laws lead to an environment of impunity 
for the perpetrators, an argument that is also applicable to other types of 
amnesties. However, it moves on by emphasising that the self proclaimed 
amnesties are contrary to the victims and their families’ right to an investi-
gation and to know the truth about past events. The court could in this case 
have done a deliberate distinction between self-proclaimed amnesties and 
amnesties which attach an investigation and hearing of the suspects and 
witnesses conducted by inter alia a TRC. The judgement suggests the abol-
ishment of certain amnesties but does not shut the door on all. 
 
The case law in Latin America suggests a general non-acceptance of amnes-
ties for serious crimes such as war crimes. The underlying reason for this is 
that such amnesties are contrary to the human right of access to court deriv-
ing from the right to a fair trial. 
 
4.4.3 The UN, Amnesties and Human rights 
 
The UN has done extensive research on impunity and human rights and sev-
eral reports have been produced. The rights supposedly violated by impu-
nity for serious international crimes are the victim’s right to know, right to 
justice and right to reparations.98 The right to justice is the relevant right in 
this case as the other rights would not necessarily be violated by the grant-
ing of amnesties but could be respected by the work by inter alia truth 
commissions. 
 
A relevant UN report states that the right to justice imposes an obligation 
upon States to investigate the events, to prosecute and, if the suspect is 
found guilty, to punish the individual in question.99 The report goes on to 
confirm that amnesties cannot be granted “before the victims have obtained 
justice by means of an effective remedy”.100 An effect of this is that the 
treaty-based and customary human rights rule of a right to justice obliges all 
States to prosecute certain serious crimes. The focus on prosecution that is 
demonstrated in this report takes the point of departure in that the granting 
of amnesties is not possible for the crimes in question.  
                                                 
98 Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Politi-
cal) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.12 October 1997 Revised final report prepared by Mr 
Joinet pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 1996/119, para. 16. 
99 ibid, para. 27. 
100 ibid, para. 32. 
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A possible further effect could be a conflict between rules of international 
human rights law giving a right to justice and domestic law granting amnes-
ties. Regarding the international perspective of this conflict international 
law would prevail before the national.101
 
4.4.4  Short Endnote on Amnesties and International Human 
Rights Law 
 
Experiences from inter alia Sierra Leone and Latin America demonstrate 
the international communities opinion that self-proclaimed amnesties are 
incompatible with the individual’s right to justice. It is however unclear if 
this conclusion can be extended to include also other types of amnesties.  
 
In my opinion the investigating and processing part of the accountability 
procedure, i.e. revealing the truth, could be satisfied by a TRC granting am-
nesties. The element a TRC lacks is the prosecution leading to a legal pun-
ishment. However, the requirement of ‘bringing to justice’ could be satisfied 
in the case of a quasi-judicial investigation by a TRC that would result in an 
amnesty if some accountability measures are attached to the truth telling. 
                                                 
101 See section 4.3.1 for further discussion in this subject.  
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5 The Principle of 
Complementarity 
5.1 Article 17 
 
“Article 17 
Issues of admissibility 
1.Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court 
shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:  
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State, which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution;  
(b) The case has been investigated by a State, which has jurisdiction 
over it, and the State has decided not to prosecute the person con-
cerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability 
of the State genuinely to prosecute;  
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct, which is the 
subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under arti-
cle 20, paragraph 3;  
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court”(own emphasis added).102
 
5.2 Negotiating the Principle of 
Complementarity 
 
A case is admissible to the ICC where it is not deemed inadmissible accord-
ing to the Rome Statute; in this case more particularly article 17 of that stat-
ute.103 I have in the following interpreted article 17 in accordance with the 
customary rules that are embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law on 
Treaties (VCLT). My intention is to understand the State Parties’ intentions 
when dealing with the problem of amnesties and complementarity.104 The 
point of departure is the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms of the treaty. When 
unsuccessful in finding a clear answer I turn to ‘any relevant rules of inter-
national law applicable between the parties’.105 This investigation is ac-
counted for largely in chapter four above. The interpretation is further made 
                                                 
102 Article 17, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
103 Broomhall, supra fn 53, p. 100. 
104 Articles 31 and 32, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties of 22 May 1969. 
105 Article 31 (3) c Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties of May 1969. 
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in the light of the principles and purposes of the statute and finally by using 
supplementary means of interpretation.106  
 
Through the course of the negotiations of the Rome Statute an alternative 
approach to the principle of complementarity was suggested. It proposed 
that the Court should not have the power to intervene when a national deci-
sion had been taken in a particular case.107 As we know, the decision to in-
clude the wider discretion of the Court relating to the issue of complemen-
tarity was later included in the statute. This could give the ICC an opportu-
nity to start an investigation although an amnesty has been granted nation-
ally in a particular case. The States’ discretion on how to fulfil its duties to 
fight impunity under the Rome Statute is thus limited in the final version of 
the statute. Unfortunately it is not clear by the phrasing of article 17 of the 
Rome Statute how far this limitation reaches.  
 
5.3 ’Investigation’ or ’Prosecution’ 
 
The definition of the word ‘investigation’ according to the Oxford English 
dictionary is “the action of investigating; the making of a search or inquiry; 
systematic examination; careful and minute research”.108 This interpretation 
is not necessarily linked to a prosecution, but appends a certain standard to 
be fulfilled by the responsible authorities in the process of granting an am-
nesty.  
 
The Oxford English dictionary has defined ‘prosecution’ to be “in strict 
technical language: a proceeding either by way of indictment or information 
in criminal courts, in order to put an offender upon his trial; the exhibition 
of a criminal charge against a person before a court of justice”.109 This defi-
nition tends to exclude the possibility of equalising a hearing with no other 
possible outcome than an amnesty by a truth commission with a prosecu-
tion. 
 
The word ‘or’ could indicate that the link between the investigation and the 
prosecution is not mandatory. This would make it possible to have an inves-
tigation that does not lead to a prosecution, hence the interpretation renders 
                                                 
106 Ulf Linderfalk, Om tolkningen av traktater, (Lunds Universitet, Lund, 2001) p. 321 
(hereinafter Linderfalk). 
107 In connection to Article 15, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court, Draft Statute & Draft Final Act (A/Conf.183/2/Add.1, 
1998), The Statute of the International Criminal Court, Compiled by M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
p. 137 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. Ardsley, New York, 1998) (hereinafter Bassiouni) 
“The Court has no jurisdiction when a question is being investigated or prosecuted, or has 
been investigated or prosecuted, by a State which has jurisdiction over it”. 
108  Ed. R.W. Burchfield, The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989) Vol. VIII, p. 47. 
109 Ed. R.W. Burchfield, The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Edition (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989) Vol XII, p. 663. 
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possible for an investigation leading up to an amnesty to be an obstacle for 
ICC prosecution. 
 
However, ‘or’ could also be a mere inclusion of the cases where an investi-
gation has been started but has still not proceeded long enough for a prose-
cution to be held.  
 
Thus, the interpretation of the words ‘investigation or prosecution’ does not 
give any definite answer whether the inclusion of amnesties is a bar to 
prosecution by the ICC according to the principle of complementarity. 
Therefore I find it necessary to continue the interpretation by using other 
available tools as presented in the VCLT. 
 
During the negotiations of the Rome Statute ‘proceedings’ was defined to 
cover both investigations and prosecutions.110 This could reflect the view 
that an investigation cannot be viewed independently from a prosecution. 
The effect would thus be that an investigation in the words of the Rome 
Statute logically is an investigation leading up to a prosecution. Some au-
thors argue that ‘investigation’ is to be interpreted as criminal investiga-
tion.111 This theory is based on the assumption that the court would expect a 
national investigation to be in accordance with the State in question’s nor-
mal investigations or prosecutions for similar conduct and that these pro-
ceedings are in accordance with international standards. The result is the 
same in both interpretations; that an investigation leading to an amnesty 
would not be in the scope of article 17, since it lacks the element of prosecu-
tion, and would thus not bar an ICC prosecution.  
  
The result of the use of other means of interpretation seems to point in the 
same direction. The principles and purposes of the Rome Statute are ex-
pressed in the preamble of the statute. Non-operative paragraph 4 states that 
the “effective prosecution” must be ensured to combat the serious crimes 
under the jurisdiction of the Court.112 This clearly indicates the States Par-
ties’ aspiration to impose obligations to prosecute the crimes in question. 
However, it is also possible to focus on non-operative paragraph 8 and 10 of 
the Rome Statute that emphasise the prohibition to intervene in a State’s 
internal affairs and the court’s complementarity to national authorities. 
Thus, these principles tend to collide when interpreting the intentions of the 
States Parties relating to amnesties and the principle of complementarity.  
 
                                                 
110 Bassiouni, supra fn 104, p. 240, fn 60. 
111 John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity in Roy S. Lee The International 
Criminal Court: The making of the Rome Statute (1999) pp. 677 and 681 (hereinafter 
Holmes). 
112 Non-operative paras. 4-5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by 
taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation,  
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to con-
tribute to the prevention of such crimes.  
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Underlying the abovementioned principles is the fundamental purpose of the 
Rome Statute that is the eradication of the crimes at hand, which is articu-
lated in non-operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. According to paragraph 4 men-
tioned above, but also to non-operative paragraphs 5 and 6 and the choice to 
create a court the negotiators seem to believe that the prosecution of alleged 
criminals best serves this purpose. Thus, one possible, and in my opinion 
reasonable, interpretation of the States’ opinions relating to the principle of 
complementarity and the principles and purposes of the Rome Statute is that 
the prosecution can be implied as an obligation that the Member States ac-
cept when ratifying the Rome Statute. This interpretation is also in accor-
dance with the ‘principle of effectiveness’ as its application gives the fullest 
weight and effect to the purposes to abolish war crimes and avoid impunity 
for these crimes.113 A final support of this interpretation could be indicated 
by the limited jurisdiction of the ICC, an incitement that where the ICC has 
jurisdiction it also has a duty to prosecute.114
 
Chapter four of this thesis concerns, as mentioned above, the interpretation 
of the principle of complementarity in relation to conventions and practice 
outside the Rome Statute. The conclusion of that investigation seems to be 
indicating an obligation to prosecute serious war crimes in international 
conflicts, but an unwillingness of States to extend this obligation implicitly. 
 
The interpretation of the words ‘investigation’ and ‘prosecution’ fails to 
provide any easy answers. As noted above, there is an erga omnes partes 
obligation to ensure the prosecution of war criminals in the Rome Statute. Is 
article 17 of the Rome Statute incompatible with the duty in question and 
thus unlawful if it allows amnesties? Is the principle of complementarity 
created to limit such a duty (the duty seizes to exist and the State discretion 
is extended) or is it a mean to implement the obligation? Perhaps the vague-
ness of the Rome Statute drafters was deliberate, not because there was a 
need for a political consensus but because there is no good, nor just alterna-
tive path. 
  
5.4 ‘Decided’ 
 
The word ‘decided’ in article 17(1) b of the Rome Statute suggests that 
there should be another possibility than non-prosecution, that the national 
authorities shall have the possibility to make a decision to prosecute.115 If 
prosecution is prevented by legislation or if some other measure makes it 
impossible for the authorities to prosecute, no decision has been made and 
the investigation performed would not block an investigation by the ICC. 
                                                 
113 Linderfalk, supra fn 106, p. 326. 
114 Article 12, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Universal jurisdiction is 
not a jurisdictional ground for the ICC. 
115 Darryl Robinson, “Serving the Interest of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and 
the International Criminal Court”, 2003, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, 
No. 3 p. 501. 
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Thus, a blanket amnesty without any investigation does not fulfil this crite-
rion but an investigating authority should have the possibility to deny am-
nesties. However, according to this theory; it seems as a conditional am-
nesty, allowing for a prosecution if certain criteria are not fulfilled, could 
block an ICC prosecution. The interpretation of ‘decided’ does thus not pro-
vide for a given answer to the problem. 
 
5.5 ‘Unwilling’  
 
“Article 17 […] 
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court 
shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized 
by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as ap-
plicable:  
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision 
was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in 
article 5;  
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings, which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice;  
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the 
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person con-
cerned to justice” (own emphasis added).116
 
When the court is determining the unwillingness of a State to prosecute it 
shall consider certain criteria enshrined in article 17(2) of the Rome Statute. 
In deciding if the granting of an amnesty by a State derives from unwilling-
ness to prosecute it will be necessary to determine the type of amnesty 
granted and to whom the amnesties in question were given. The paragraph 
refers to ‘the principles of due process recognized by international law’. If 
the case in question concerns blanket amnesties or amnesties that are given 
to all but very few of the most responsible the ICC may find the State in 
question to be ‘unwilling’ to prosecute. Already performed investigations of 
co-perpetrators will be of guidance to the ICC when determining a State’s 
unwillingness.117. 
 
By using the term ‘unwillingness’ the court is left with a wide measure of 
discretion in each individual case when deciding upon the admissibility of a 
case. It does not provide for any further understanding of the relation be-
tween the perception of unwillingness and the granting of amnesties al-
though the requirements for a due process suggests that the investigation in 
question should have a judicial or at least a quasi-judicial character. Self 
                                                 
116 Article 17, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
117 Holmes, supra fn 112, s. 675. 
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proclaimed and blanket amnesty not related to any investigation would be 
difficult to interpret as anything but that the State is ‘unwilling’.   
                                                                                                                                                                 
5.6 Article 17 and Amnesties 
 
Though vague in formulation it is clear that article 17 rules out blanket am-
nesties as a bar to prosecution. This type of amnesties fails to provide for an 
investigation, it does not leave a possibility for a decision to prosecute for 
the national authorities and the State thus fails to demonstrate a willingness 
to prosecute. The situation is not as clear concerning conditional amnesties.  
 
According to the wording of the preamble of the Rome Statute and the pur-
pose of the ICC- to fight impunity- and the obligation upon States to ensure 
the prosecution of war criminals, the point of departure would consequently 
not make the granting of a national amnesty an inadmissibility ground. 
However, if the reading is made in the light of the purpose to fight impunity 
for war crimes in a more general manner the outcome may be different. Ac-
countability is not necessarily equal to prosecution. Further, the most impor-
tant purpose of the principle of complementarity is the preservation of State 
sovereignty. In spite of this and after the interpretation of the principle of 
complementarity as formulated in article 17 made in this chapter I believe 
that the States Parties of the Rome Statute did not contemplate a national 
amnesty to be an inadmissibility ground for a case according to the article in 
question.  
 
5.7 Other Relevant Articles in the Rome Statute 
Concerning Obstacles for Prosecution  
 
The following articles are included to demonstrate principally two things. 
Articles 16 and 53 are solutions for the above mentioned practical problems 
with an absolute obligation to prosecute. Article 20 is an example of a pro-
vision which has excluded the granting of amnesties in its functioning; it 
could be possible to make an analogy with that provision and article 17.  
 
5.7.1 Article 16 
 
There may be a situation where a criminal prosecution and a peace agree-
ment cannot be pursued parallel; a common scenario is that the alleged per-
petrators take part in the peace negotiations. To insist on a prosecution 
could at such time put the peace venture at risk. The drafters of the Rome 
Statute have foreseen this situation and consequently they have included 
article 16 in the Rome Statute. The provision gives peace temporary priority 
over prosecution but does not necessarily exclude prosecution in the future. 
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The article in question allows the Security Council to provide for a tempo-
rary amnesty by deferring a prosecution of the ICC when such an investiga-
tion would negatively affect a peace process. As this safeguard exists in the 
Rome Statute the argument of amnesties in order to create peace as a bar to 
prosecution according to the principle of complementarity must be partly 
dismissed. The situation when a decision is not feasible in the Security 
Council remains, thereof the partial and not entire dismissal. I will come 
back to this situation in chapter 6.  
 
The opponents of amnesties as a measure to create peace often state that 
there can be no lasting peace without justice. In the resolutions establishing 
the international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda the UN Se-
curity Council expressed this view.118 The UN has in other contexts acted 
consistently with the Security Council decisions, inter alia in the case of 
Sierra Leone119 and when the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeep-
ing Operations stated that the Security Council should work to ensure that 
amnesties for war crimes are not granted in peace-agreements.120 Many in-
ternational legal scholars agree with this position.121 In this line of argumen-
tation one fear often expressed is that the stabilisation process is endangered 
if amnesties are granted since perpetrators may repeat the commission of the 
crimes in question. Another is that the reinstallation of the rule of law is 
made more difficult without a judicial encounter with past atrocities.  
 
 
5.7.2 Article 20 
 
“Article 20 
Ne bis in idem 
1.Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the 
Court with respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which 
the person has been convicted or acquitted by the Court. 
2.No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 
5 for which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the 
Court.  
                                                 
118 Security Council Resolution 808, 3175th Meeting, on 22 February 1993, Security Coun-
cil Resolution 827, 217th Meeting, on 25 May 1993 and Security Council Resolution 955, 
3453rd Meeting, on 8 November 1994, Security Council Resolution 977, 3502nd  Meeting, 
on 22 February 1995. 
119 supra and  Security Council Resolution 1315, adopted at the 4186th meeting at 14 august 
2000. 
120 Restoring the rule of law absolutely essential for resolving conflict; Rebuilding secure, 
humane societies, Security Council told, Security Council 4835th meeting, Press Release 
SC/7884, 30 September 2003.  
121 inter alia Written Submission on Behalf of the Redress Trust, the Lawyers for Human 
Rights and the International Commission of Jurists in relation to Prosecutor v. Morris 
Kallon, 16 March 2004, Special Court for Sierra Leone (Appeals Chamber) Case No. 
SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) <http://www.redress.org/casework/SLSC-
FurtherSubmissions.pdf> Last accessed 8 November 2004. paras. 5 and 12. 
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3.No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed 
under article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same 
conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:  
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or  
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accor-
dance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and 
were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice” (own emphasis 
added).122
 
Article 20 of the Rome Statute enshrines the principle of ne bis in idem for 
cases when the person in question has been “tried in a court”.123 The article 
explicitly states that a court procedure is necessary and excludes the men-
tioning of amnesties, which imply that amnesties would not hinder the ICC 
to try a case if the individual in question has been granted an amnesty.  
 
My personal reflection in this regard is that for the Rome Statute to be in 
harmony this should apply also to cases where an amnesty has not been 
granted but is expected, something that would lead to an exclusion of am-
nesties as a bar to an ICC prosecution. 
 
 
5.7.3 Article 53 
 
“Article 53 
Initiation of an investigation 
1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to 
him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is 
no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to 
initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:  
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis 
to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is 
being committed;  
(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and  
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, 
there are none the less substantial reasons to believe that an investigation 
would not serve the interests of justice.” 
 
Article 53 of the Rome Statute allows the prosecutor to omit to prosecute an 
individual when he finds that it would not be in the interest of justice to do 
so.124 Thus, the Statute leaves the prosecutor certain measure of discretion 
that could be necessary when a situation occurs that inter alia would burden 
                                                 
122 Article 20, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
123 ibid 
124 Article 53, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
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the organization in an indefensible manner or that could jeopardize the en-
tire judicial system.125 The prosecutor could according to this article refrain 
from prosecuting an alleged perpetrator which has previously been granted 
an amnesty if he or she finds it to be in the interest of justice to abstain. 
 
The existence of this article in the Rome Statute could be an indication that 
if a case occurs where an amnesty would be or had been granted, and the 
prosecutor has taken the decision to prosecute in spite of the amnesty, the 
presumption for the court would be that the amnesty would not be an in-
admissibility ground. 
 
 
5.8 Codifying the Limits of Amnesties 
 
For the reasons accounted for above I believe that the prosecutor of the ICC 
would apply article 53 if she or he would find that a national amnesty would 
constitute a bar to the prosecution of alleged perpetrators of war crimes. In 
doing so he or she must be flexible when regulating this issue to concord 
with reality but the prosecutor must also set firm limits to preserve the le-
gitimacy and credibility of the ICC.  
 
I believe it is of great importance that these limits are clearly defined and 
agreed upon. There are several motives for this. The protection of the gen-
eral rule of law of predictability is one important reason. The safeguard 
against the arbitration and politicisation of the prosecutor that could lead to 
a destabilisation of the sovereign equality between the Member States is 
another. 
 
An intention to define the limits of amnesties has been made by Andreas 
O’Shea in a draft protocol to the Rome Statute.126 The provisions of the 
draft convention suggest that no amnesties are given for war crimes.127 It 
does nonetheless provide for exceptions to prosecution. The essence of the 
exceptions is that the UN has agreed to the amnesty, that the amnesty in 
question fulfils certain criteria and that the amnesty law is made public.128 It 
is thus not in discord with the general opinion of ‘accepted’ amnesties, 
which is accounted for in part 3.2 of this thesis. 
 
The draft convention is not applicable to amnesties passed in the implemen-
tation of a peace treaty concluded between two or more States, which has as 
its main purpose the resolution of an armed conflict and the maintenance of 
                                                 
125 Robinson, supra fn 116. 
126 O’Shea, supra 55 Draft Protocol to the Statute of the International Criminal Court on 
the Proper Limitations to Municipal Amnesties Promulgated in Times of Transition’ (here-
inafter Draft Protocol…). 
127 Ibid, Article 3, also includes genocide, crimes against humanity, the crime of aggres-
sion, torture, slavery, piracy, apartheid, summary executions and enforced disappearances.  
128 Ibid, Article 6 for the criteria for an amnesty see section 3.2 above. 
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peace between those States.129 I do not agree completely with this view.  
That maintenance of international peace and security has the highest priority 
in international law is in itself not controversial, giving inter alia UN Secu-
rity Council competence under chapter seven of the UN Charter. However, 
the rationale behind the provision does not require a permanent amnesty. It 
would be in greater accordance with article 16 of the Rome Statute that pro-
vides for a UN Security Council deferral with the purpose of maintenance of 
international peace and security, if there was a time limit attached to the 
amnesty. A temporary granting of amnesties could ensure the peace negotia-
tions to succeed and at the same time avoid compromising the fight against 
impunity.  
                                                 
129 Ibid, Article 2. 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Variance of amnesties 
 
In assessing whether a particular amnesty bars prosecution by the ICC, it is 
crucial to recognise the variance of amnesties. An unconditional, self-
proclaimed amnesty cannot prevent a prosecution as it qualifies as a sham 
trial in accordance with article 17 (1) a or b of the Rome Statute. Therefore, 
the amnesties referred to below are those admitted following investigations 
and hearings held by TRCs and comparable mechanisms.  
 
6.2 Justice 
 
This thesis has illustrated the difficulty in finding an adequate balance be-
tween different readings of the principle of complementarity. Essentially, 
the conclusion is that an amnesty is not an obstacle for the admittance of a 
case before the ICC. However, the Rome Statute leaves one possibility to 
allow amnesties for war crimes in particular cases.  
 
The prosecutor may decide, ‘in the interest of justice’, not to prosecute a 
case according to article 53 of the Statute. However, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
may review such decision, therefore the prosecutor’s decision cannot di-
verge from the court’s general policy.130
 
In the course of the prosecutor’s consideration some important questions of 
justice become relevant. Is it an injustice to grant war criminals amnesties? 
Such an assertion is motivated by the fact that the perpetrator “deserves” 
punishment, that criminals who have committed minor crimes which are 
excluded from the amnesty exception obtain tougher punishment and finally 
that a war criminal’s victims along with their relatives are entitled to a right 
of justice.  
 
“The ends do not justify the means” many people would argue, implying 
that it is impossible to create justice by committing injustice. Proponents 
would argue that amnesties are justified in certain situations, although they 
may be unjust. Although this very interesting but fundamentally moral dis-
cussion influences a decision by the prosecutor there is no room in for the 
current legal investigation to further examine these questions.131
 
                                                 
130 Article 53 (3) b, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
131 See instead inter alia Kent Greenawalt, “Amnesty’s Justice” in R.I Rotberg and D. 
Thompson (eds.) Truth v. Justice (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2000) p. 191. 
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6.3 Main Problems with an Absolute Obligation 
to Prosecute War Criminals 
 
In my opinion, there are mainly two problems in the imposition of an abso-
lute prohibition of granting amnesties to war criminals following a conflict. 
Firstly; prosecution requires considerable financial resources as large num-
bers of perpetrators and victims are usually involved, particularly if a con-
flict was internal. At the same time, a newly war ridden country has a num-
ber of more urgent matters to attend to. In a situation where authorities with 
limited resources are struggling to reconstruct a country, prosecution of war 
criminals is not likely to an immediate priority. The establishment of a TRC 
with the power to grant amnesties could be the only realistic solution to 
avoid impunity.  
 
A further problem relates to State sovereignty. I believe that there is an im-
portant distinction to be made between fighting impunity and prosecution. 
The international legal system may, and in my opinion, in the interest of 
preserving its legitimacy, should be required to, impose obligations on 
States to hold accountable perpetrators of serious war crimes. The rationale 
here is to reveal the truth about past incidents, to pay reparations to victims 
and to punish the perpetrators. A further underlying objective would be of 
preventative nature to avoid such crimes in the future.  In my opinion such 
purposes must clearly prevail over State sovereignty.  
 
However, to dictate how to accomplish these goals is perhaps to transcend 
beyond the limits of interference. Yet, by signing the Rome Statute a State 
has delegated its right to prosecute when failing to do so itself. By enshrin-
ing the principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute the international 
community could succeed in avoiding impunity whilst at the same time pro-
tecting State sovereignty. This is achieved by supervising the fulfilment of 
the objectives and limiting intervention to State malfunction. Within the set 
limits, each society must try to find its own balancing act of retributive and 
restorative justice.  
 
6.4 Practical Advantages of Defining Legal 
Amnesties 
 
As noticed in chapter 4, an amnesty may be valid as a bar to national prose-
cution according to national legislation. Whether that same amnesty is ac-
cepted internationally is a different issue. If a State adopts amnesties that are 
contrary to international requirements that same State would consequently 
act in violation of international law.  
 
Appropriate guidelines concerning amnesties could cause other States and 
institutions representing the international community to challenge unlawful 
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amnesties.132 It may well, for political reasons, be less difficult for another 
State to challenge an amnesty than it is for the ICC, especially if the am-
nesty in question was brokered by the UN. Another State’s challenge could 
be particularly important in practice if the challenged State is outside the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.  
 
International recognition is important for a State when deciding whether to 
challenge an amnesty granted by another State but it is also important for 
the investigation of the principle of complementarity. 
 
6.5 The Applicability of the Principle of 
Complementarity in Relation to Amnesties  
 
As an international law student I am a firm believer in the importance of 
invoking the rule of law to create stability and to avoid arbitrary decisions 
and corruption. The ICC constitutes a great progress in this regard, thus it 
would be unfortunate to leave any lacunae of law that would disavow its 
work in favour of politics and self-interest.  
 
The wording of the principle of complementarity is ambiguous regarding 
amnesties; it leaves room for interpretations. However, through the interpre-
tation made in this thesis some conclusions regarding the principle of com-
plementarity and amnesties can be presented.   
⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
                                                
The point of departure should be prosecution whereas amnesty is an 
exception. The granting of amnesties should be especially restrictive 
when granted the most responsible for war crimes. 
Should an amnesty be granted the objective ought to be that it is granted 
on a temporary basis. Article 17 is thereby in accordance with article 
16 of the statute and may be applied for a temporary amnesty when a 
Security Council deferral is not conceivable. 
If an amnesty is granted it should be brokered by the UN. This provision 
functions as a further safeguard against self proclaimed amnesties and 
would grant the amnesty in question international credibility. 
The public should have free access to the process of granting an am-
nesty. The rationale is here to respect the individual’s right to access of 
justice. 
Lawful amnesties should be adequately defined. The process should 
fulfil certain conditions to ensure that the perpetrators are held account-
able and that the truth is known.133 
 
If the criteria for an amnesty are defined and thus the exceptions to prosecu-
tion are fully recognised there would be no contradiction between all war 
crimes having the character of jus cogens and that these norms would attach 
 
132 Broomhall, supra fn 53, p. 96. 
133 In accordance with points 1-10 listed in section 3.2. 
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an erga omnes obligation to prosecute them on the one hand and the grant-
ing of amnesties for such crimes on the other. An example of a similar situa-
tion could be the legal status for the prohibition of the use of force and the 
legal exceptions to it. By defining internationally lawful amnesties, a paral-
lel strengthening of the legal character of holding perpetrators of war crimes 
accountable does appear possible. In my opinion, it would thus be construc-
tive for the Member States of the ICC to define and consolidate limits for 
granting amnesties. If the requirements for a successful process of account-
ability are realistic and based on common ground we can increase the hope 
for diminishing war crimes in the future. By mending its flaws the ICC 
would become the successful guardian of humanitarian law it has the poten-
tial to be. 
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